The sun came up clear over the Russian lines at about half past five, and Napoleon, who had been awake most of the night with a heavy cold and a bladder complaint, is reported by his aide Philippe de Segur to have greeted it as the sun of Austerlitz. He had spent the previous day studying a portrait of his infant son, newly arrived from Paris, and reading a dispatch announcing Wellington’s victory at Salamanca. He had also turned down a proposal from Marshal Davout to march round the Russian left by night. He wanted a battle, not a manoeuvre, and after ten weeks of pursuing an army that would not stand, he finally had one in front of him.
The Russians under Mikhail Kutuzov, about 120,000 regulars with Cossacks and militia besides, held a line of low hills behind the Kolocha stream. Its strongpoints were a large battery in the centre, known afterwards as the Raevsky redoubt, and three arrow-shaped earthworks on the left held by Prince Bagration. Napoleon had roughly 130,000 men and 587 guns. His plan was a frontal assault.
The guns opened at six. For the next six hours French, Polish, German and Italian infantry stormed the left-hand earthworks, lost them, and stormed them again, some accounts say seven or eight times, across ground so covered with bodies that horses refused to cross it. Around ten o’clock a shell splinter smashed Bagration’s leg. He was carried off, and the Russian left gave way as far as the ruined village of Semyonovskoe.
The redoubt in the centre was taken in the afternoon, after a Russian cavalry raid round the French left had delayed the attack by two hours, in a charge by cuirassiers who rode in through the back of the work. Their commander, Auguste de Caulaincourt, was killed at the entrance. The Russian line bent back about a mile and stayed there, re-forming under fire. Ney, Murat and Davout sent to ask for the Imperial Guard, 18,000 fresh men, to finish it. Napoleon refused. He would not, he is said to have replied, have his last reserve destroyed eight hundred leagues from Paris.
By six in the evening the firing had died away. The French artillery had fired some 60,000 rounds. Between them the armies had lost something like 70,000 killed and wounded, a figure not equalled in a single day of European war for a century. Kutuzov reported that the enemy had nowhere gained a foot of ground and ordered an attack for the morning. Then the returns came in showing that a third or more of his army was gone, and during the night he withdrew towards Moscow.
How it came to this
Napoleon had crossed the river Niemen in June 1812 with the largest army Europe had seen, more than 450,000 men in the first wave, of whom fewer than half were French. His quarrel with Tsar Alexander I was over Russia’s withdrawal from the blockade of British trade, and his aim was a quick, crushing battle near the frontier followed by a dictated peace. The Russian armies, outnumbered, declined to give him one. They fell back for 500 miles, burning stores as they went, while heat, hunger, typhus and desertion cut the invading main force to a third of its strength.
The retreat was the policy of the war minister, Barclay de Tolly, from a Baltic German family of Scottish descent, whom many Russian officers called a coward or a traitor for it. After the loss of Smolensk in August, Alexander gave way to opinion and appointed the sixty-six-year-old Kutuzov, a pupil of Suvorov and a Russian of the Russians, to the supreme command. Kutuzov privately thought Barclay had been right. But Moscow could not be given up without a fight, and he chose his ground at Borodino.