Prince Eugene of Savoy had held the chief command of the Habsburg army in Hungary for barely two months. The force he took over in July 1697 was unpaid, hungry and scattered, and the Ottoman army coming north from Belgrade was led by Sultan Mustafa II in person, the first sultan in generations to take the field year after year. Through August the two armies manoeuvred across the plain between the Danube and the Tisza. The sultan’s council could not agree on a target and finally decided to cross the Tisza eastwards and march on Transylvania.
On 11 September Eugene’s hussars brought in a captured Ottoman officer. Under threat he told them what Eugene most wanted to know: the Ottomans had thrown a bridge of boats across the river at the small town of Zenta, the sultan, the cavalry and most of the guns were already on the far bank, and the infantry was still waiting on the near side behind a half-finished earthwork. Eugene rode ahead with his cavalry, saw for himself that it was true, and ordered the infantry to follow at a forced pace. They had already been marching for most of the day.
It was about four in the afternoon when his roughly 50,000 men were in position, drawn up in a half-circle that pinned the Ottoman foot against the water. There was no time for a bombardment. The Imperial left wing found that the river was low and that sandbanks along the shore let them wade round the end of the entrenchment. They got in behind the defenders and reached the bridgehead. With the only way out cut, the Ottoman line collapsed.
What followed was a massacre more than a battle. The janissaries, crowded onto the bridge and the bank, were shot down or driven into the river and drowned. Some turned on their own commanders, and the Grand Vizier, Elmas Mehmed Pasha, was killed, by most accounts by his own troops. The sultan watched from the opposite shore and could send no help. Eugene reported to the emperor that his men could stand on the heaped bodies as if on islands, and that the sun had seemed unwilling to set before it had seen the victory complete.
The Habsburg army lost perhaps four hundred and thirty dead. Ottoman losses are usually put at 25,000 to 30,000. The booty included the army’s pay chest, eighty-seven cannon, thousands of camels and, taken from the vizier’s body, the great seal of the empire, which no enemy had captured before. The sultan fled to Temesvar. Eugene, short of supplies and with the season late, did not pursue; in October he led a fast raid into Bosnia and burned Sarajevo.
How it came to this
The war had begun in 1683 when an Ottoman army besieged Vienna and was driven off. In the years that followed the Habsburgs and their allies in the Holy League, Poland, Venice and later Russia, took Buda, most of Hungary and for a time Belgrade. Then Louis XIV attacked in the west, the emperor moved his best troops to the Rhine, and the Ottomans recovered Belgrade in 1690. The eastern front settled into costly stalemate. Only in 1697, as the war with France was ending, could Vienna spare men and money again.
Eugene was a French subject by birth, the son of a Savoyard prince and of Olympia Mancini, a niece of Cardinal Mazarin who left France under suspicion in the Affair of the Poisons. Small and plain, he had been intended for the Church. When Louis XIV refused him a commission in 1683 he slipped out of France and offered himself to the emperor in time to fight at the relief of Vienna. He was a field marshal at twenty-nine. The Hungarian command came to him when the Elector of Saxony gave it up to become King of Poland.