On the morning of 18 Brumaire in the Year VIII of the Republic, 9 November 1799, the upper chamber of the French legislature, the Council of Ancients, was summoned at an unusually early hour, and the members thought likely to object were not told. Those present were informed that a Jacobin plot threatened the Republic. They voted to move both chambers out of Paris to the palace of Saint-Cloud the next day and to give General Napoleon Bonaparte command of the troops in the capital. All of this was legal. That was the point of the plan.
The plan belonged less to Bonaparte than to Emmanuel Sieyès, one of the five Directors who governed France, who wanted a stronger executive and had been looking for what he called a sword. Bonaparte, back from Egypt for barely three weeks, was the sword available. By the afternoon Sieyès and his colleague Roger Ducos had resigned, a third Director, Paul Barras, had been talked into resigning by Talleyrand, and the remaining two were under guard in the Luxembourg palace. The executive had ceased to exist without a shot.
The second day went wrong. At Saint-Cloud on 19 Brumaire the rooms were not ready, and for hours deputies stood about comparing notes and noticing that nobody could describe the plot. When the lower house, the Council of Five Hundred, finally met in the Orangery, its members insisted on swearing loyalty to the constitution one by one. Bonaparte lost patience. He addressed the Ancients first and did it badly, rambling about the god of war and the god of fortune. Then he walked into the Five Hundred with an escort of grenadiers.
Soldiers on the floor of the chamber were an outrage, and the deputies reacted as one. They shouted ‘Outlaw him!’ and ‘Down with the dictator!’, the cry that had destroyed Robespierre. Bonaparte was seized by the collar, shaken and pushed, and his grenadiers had to pull him out. Witnesses describe him pale and barely coherent. The chamber’s president was his brother Lucien, aged twenty-four. Lucien refused to put the motion of outlawry to the vote, left the chair, mounted a horse in the courtyard and told the guard that the assembly was being terrorised by a handful of deputies with daggers, in English pay. He held a sword to his brother’s chest and swore to run him through if he ever harmed French liberty.
It worked. Joachim Murat led the grenadiers into the Orangery with drums beating, and the deputies left by the doors and, according to most accounts, the windows. That night a few dozen of them were rounded up to give the proceedings a vote. They abolished the Directory and named three provisional consuls: Bonaparte, Sieyès and Ducos. Within six weeks a new constitution had made Bonaparte First Consul and left Sieyès with a pension and an estate.
How it came to this
The Directory had ruled France since 1795 under a constitution designed to prevent both a king and a second Terror. It did so by annulling elections whenever they went against it: against royalists in 1797, against Jacobins in 1798. By 1799 it was at war with a second coalition of Austria, Russia and Britain, its paper money was worthless, parts of the west and south were in armed revolt and a forced loan had frightened property owners. Many who had done well out of the Revolution wanted its gains made safe by someone strong.
Bonaparte had made his name in Italy in 1796-97 and then taken an army to Egypt, where Nelson destroyed his fleet. In August 1799 he left that army behind and sailed for France, landing in October to cheering crowds who knew of his victories and little of his failures. The military emergency that had seemed to justify a rescue was in fact already passing: Masséna had beaten the Russians at Zurich in September and an Anglo-Russian landing in Holland had been defeated.