On 10 November 1775 the Second Continental Congress, sitting in the Pennsylvania State House in Philadelphia, resolved that two battalions of marines be raised, with one colonel, two lieutenant colonels, two majors and the usual junior officers. The men were to be good seamen, or so acquainted with maritime affairs as to be able to serve to advantage by sea, and the units were to be called the first and second battalions of American Marines. The war with Britain was seven months old. There was as yet no declaration of independence and scarcely a navy.
The purpose was specific. Congress was considering an expedition against Halifax in Nova Scotia, the main British naval base on the coast, and the marines were to be its landing force. They were to be drawn from the army George Washington commanded outside Boston. Washington did not like it. He wrote to Congress that picking out men who knew the sea would break up regiments he was struggling to hold together through the winter, and Congress backed down. The Halifax scheme was dropped, and the two battalions were never formed as written.
What survived was the idea of marines. On 28 November Congress commissioned Samuel Nicholas, a Philadelphian from a family of tavern keepers and a keen fox-hunter, as captain of marines, the first officer of the service. Recruiting went on through the winter in the city’s waterfront taverns, to the sound of a drum, among sailors, tradesmen and recent immigrants. Marine tradition fixes it at the Tun Tavern on Water Street, whose proprietor, Robert Mullan, became a marine captain himself.
In February 1776 Nicholas and some 230 marines sailed from the Delaware with the small squadron of Commodore Esek Hopkins. Hopkins had orders for the Chesapeake but went instead to the Bahamas, where the British were known to keep gunpowder. On 3 March the marines and fifty sailors landed from boats on New Providence, east of Nassau. It was the first amphibious landing in the service’s history. They took Fort Montagu without loss and Nassau the next morning.
They were too slow. The governor, Montfort Browne, had used the night to load most of the powder on to a ship and send it to Florida. The Americans stayed two weeks, loaded the forts’ cannon and mortars and the governor himself, and sailed home. Marines later crossed the Delaware with Washington and fought at Princeton. When the war ended there was no money for a navy; the last ship was sold in 1785 and the Continental Marines had ceased to exist.
How it came to this
Marines were not an American invention. Spain had kept naval infantry since the sixteenth century, and Britain since 1664; colonial Americans had served in British marine regiments, notably the force raised for the disastrous attack on Cartagena in 1741. Their work on board was to fight from the tops and the deck with muskets in action, to form landing parties, and to stand guard between the officers and a crew that might be pressed, underpaid and mutinous.
In the autumn of 1775 Congress was building a navy out of converted merchantmen. A naval committee, in which John Adams of Massachusetts was the driving member, met in the evenings in a Philadelphia tavern to write regulations and buy ships. The first vessels were authorised in October, the marines in November, and rules for the navy at the end of that month. Most of the colonies also raised marines for their own state navies, and privateers carried them as well. The Continental Marines were always few, probably never more than about two thousand men over the whole war.