By the night of 2 November 1942 Field Marshal Erwin Rommel knew the battle was lost. His army had been under attack for ten days on a forty-mile front between the Mediterranean and the impassable Qattara Depression. He had about thirty-five German tanks still running, almost no fuel, and Italian infantry divisions with no vehicles to carry them out. That evening he signalled Berlin that he was pulling back to Fuka, sixty miles west, and the first units began to move.
The answer arrived early in the afternoon of 3 November. Hitler forbade any withdrawal. The troops were to hold where they stood, and Rommel was told he could show them no other road than the one leading to victory or death. Rommel, who had built his reputation on ignoring orders he thought foolish, obeyed this one. He halted the retreat for almost twenty-four hours and later called it the decision he most regretted.
On the other side Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery was grinding forward on a plan he had revised more than once. His opening assault on 23 October, behind the fire of nearly nine hundred guns, had not broken through the minefields as intended. The Australians had spent a week pulling German reserves north towards the coast road. On 2 November a second blow, codenamed Supercharge, went in further south. The 9th Armoured Brigade was sent against the anti-tank screen at dawn, with Montgomery’s acceptance that it might be wiped out, and lost some seventy of its ninety-four tanks.
The sacrifice opened the way. Before dawn on 4 November Indian and Highland infantry cut a gap south of Tel el Aqqaqir, and British armour drove through into open desert. The Italian Ariete armoured division, in obsolete tanks, fought until it was surrounded and destroyed. General Wilhelm von Thoma, commander of the Afrika Korps, was captured beside a burning tank and dined that night with Montgomery. In the afternoon Rommel ordered the retreat on his own authority. Hitler’s permission came the next day.
The Germans took what transport there was. Tens of thousands of Italians in the southern sector, including the paratroopers of the Folgore division, were left on foot without water and surrendered over the following days. Eighth Army counted some 13,500 killed, wounded and missing. Axis losses are harder to fix, but around 30,000 prisoners were taken. In Britain, on 15 November, church bells that had been silent since 1940, reserved as an invasion warning, were rung for a victory.
How it came to this
The war in the desert had swung back and forth across Libya for two years, each side advancing until it outran its supplies. In June 1942 Rommel took Tobruk with 33,000 prisoners and chased Eighth Army into Egypt. General Claude Auchinleck stopped him in July at the Alamein position, the last defensible line before Alexandria and the Suez Canal, in a series of costly actions now called the first battle. Churchill, impatient for an offensive, replaced Auchinleck in August. The intended commander of Eighth Army, William Gott, was shot down and killed on his way to take up the post, and Montgomery was sent instead.
Time favoured the British. Montgomery repelled Rommel’s last attack at Alam Halfa at the start of September and then refused to move until he had overwhelming strength: roughly 195,000 men against 105,000 and more than a thousand tanks against about five hundred, including new American Shermans. Codebreakers at Bletchley Park were reading Axis signals, and submarines and aircraft from Malta were sinking the tankers Rommel depended on. Rommel himself was on sick leave in Austria when the attack began. His deputy, Georg Stumme, died of a heart attack on the first morning.