A little before noon on 14 March 1757, in a hard wind and rain, Admiral John Byng came out of the great cabin of the Monarch on to the quarterdeck. He was fifty-two, the son of a famous admiral, and wore a plain grey coat. A cushion had been laid on the planking, with a heap of sawdust beside it. Boats crowded with spectators lay all around the ship, and the crews of the fleet had been ordered into the rigging to watch.
Byng had intended to face the firing party with his eyes open. His friends persuaded him that the sight of his face might unsteady the marines, and he agreed to a blindfold for their sake. He knelt, tied the handkerchief himself, and held a second one in his hand as the signal. When he dropped it the marines fired a single volley and he fell dead on his side. Those present, including officers who had no love for him, recorded that he showed no trace of fear.
His offence dated from the previous spring. In April 1756, with war against France imminent, he had been sent from England with ten ships of the line, short of men and in poor repair, to protect the British island base of Minorca. He arrived to find a French army of 15,000 already ashore and the garrison shut up in Fort St Philip. On 20 May he fought the French fleet under the Marquis de La Galissoniere. His leading ships closed and were badly knocked about; the rear, where Byng was, became tangled behind a disabled vessel and scarcely engaged. The French drew off. Four days later a council of his captains agreed unanimously that the fleet could do nothing more for the fort and should fall back to cover Gibraltar. Minorca surrendered at the end of June.
The news caused an uproar in Britain. Byng was burned in effigy in dozens of towns, and the Duke of Newcastle’s ministry, which had sent him out late and weak, was glad to see the anger aimed at him. His dispatch was printed with the passages explaining his reasons cut out. He was brought home under arrest.
The court martial sat for a month at Portsmouth. It cleared him of cowardice and of disaffection, but found that he had not done his utmost to relieve the fort or destroy the enemy. Under the twelfth Article of War, as tightened in 1749, that finding carried death with no alternative. The thirteen officers passed the sentence and in the same breath begged the Admiralty to obtain the king’s mercy. William Pitt pleaded for him; the Commons passed a bill to let the judges explain themselves, and the Lords threw it out. George II would not pardon him.
How it came to this
Britain and France had been fighting undeclared in North America and at sea since 1754, and the conflict that became the Seven Years’ War was formally declared in May 1756, days before Byng’s battle. Minorca, taken from Spain in 1708, gave the Royal Navy its only deep-water harbour in the western Mediterranean. The ministry had ample warning that the French were preparing an expedition at Toulon but, fearing an invasion of England, kept its best ships in the Channel and sent Byng with what was left.
The law that killed him was itself a reaction to failure. After the indecisive battle off Toulon in 1744, a series of courts martial had let hesitant officers off lightly, and Parliament was scandalised. The revised Articles of War of 1749 removed the courts’ discretion: an officer who through cowardice, negligence or disaffection failed to do his utmost in action was to die. Byng had himself sat on one of the Toulon courts. Nobody had expected the clause to be applied to an error of judgement by a commander-in-chief.