On the night of 7 July 1937 a company of Japanese infantry was practising a night attack on waste ground beside the Yongding River, about ten miles south-west of the city then called Beiping. A few hundred yards away stood the small walled town of Wanping and, beyond it, the long stone bridge with its hundreds of carved lions that Marco Polo had admired six centuries before. Both were held by soldiers of the Chinese 29th Army. At about twenty to eleven a few rifle shots came out of the darkness from the direction of the river bank.
The company commander, Captain Shimizu Setsuro, halted the exercise and called the roll. One man, Private Shimura Kikujiro, did not answer. Shimizu sent a rider to his battalion commander, Major Ichiki Kiyonao, who telephoned the regiment in Beiping. By the time Japanese officers arrived at the gate of Wanping to demand entry to search for their soldier, Shimura had rejoined his unit; he seems simply to have lost his way. The demand was not withdrawn. The Chinese garrison refused to open the gate.
Through the small hours officers from both sides, with the county magistrate Wang Lengzhai, argued inside the town about a joint investigation. Outside, the Japanese brought up the rest of the battalion and some guns. Around five in the morning, after more shots, and with the approval of the regimental commander, Colonel Mutaguchi Renya, Ichiki ordered an attack. The Chinese at the bridge, under orders from their regimental commander Ji Xingwen to hold, fought back, and there was fighting around the bridge and the town through the following day.
This need not have gone further. The local commanders, who had patched up several such clashes before, agreed a ceasefire on 11 July under which the Chinese would apologise and pull back from the town. But the same day in Tokyo the cabinet of Prince Konoe approved sending reinforcements from Korea, Manchuria and Japan itself, and announced it publicly. In China, Chiang Kai-shek ordered divisions north and on 17 July declared at the mountain resort of Lushan that the limit of endurance had been reached: if war came, every person, north or south, young or old, had a duty to resist.
At the end of July the Japanese army in north China, by then heavily reinforced, attacked in strength. Beiping and Tianjin fell within three days. In August the fighting spread to Shanghai, and there was no more talk of an incident.
How it came to this
Japanese troops had a legal right to be near Beijing. The protocol imposed on China after the Boxer uprising of 1901 allowed foreign powers to station guards along the railway from the capital to the sea, and Japan’s China Garrison Army, a separate force from the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, had recently been enlarged to several thousand men. What had changed was everything around them. In 1931 officers of the Kwantung Army staged an explosion on a railway at Mukden and used it to seize Manchuria, which became the client state of Manchukuo. Further pressure in 1933 and 1935 pushed Chinese government forces and party offices out of much of the north.
Chiang Kai-shek had given ground for years, holding that China must first defeat its Communists and build an army. In December 1936 his own generals kidnapped him at Xi’an and obliged him to agree to a united front against Japan. By the summer of 1937 the Japanese had occupied the rail junction at Fengtai, and the line across the Marco Polo Bridge was the last one linking Beiping to the rest of China. Neither side’s local soldiers could afford another retreat.