Parallax

7 August, 1942

The Marines land on Guadalcanal

Eight months after Pearl Harbor the United States made its first offensive landing of the war, on a jungle island few Americans had heard of. The beach was the easy part. Within two days the navy had sailed away and left the Marines with half their supplies.

Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands

Shortly after six on the morning of 7 August 1942, cruisers and destroyers opened fire on the north coast of Guadalcanal and on the small islands of Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo twenty miles across the sound. Low cloud and rain had hidden the approach of some eighty ships, and the Japanese on shore had no warning. A radio operator on Tulagi got off a message that a large enemy force had arrived, and later a last one saying the garrison would defend its post to the death.

On Guadalcanal itself the landing was almost unopposed. About 11,000 men of the 1st Marine Division, under Major General Alexander Vandegrift, went ashore east of Lunga Point and pushed inland through coconut plantations and kunai grass. Their objective was an airstrip the Japanese had nearly finished, whose discovery by reconnaissance a month earlier had turned a planned operation into an urgent one. The builders, some 2,500 men, most of them Korean and Japanese labourers, fled west into the jungle. By the afternoon of the second day the Marines held the runway, along with stores of rice, a power plant, trucks and an ice-making machine.

The small islands were different. On Tulagi and the twin islets of Gavutu and Tanambogo about 900 Japanese naval troops fought from caves and dugouts for the better part of three days. Almost none surrendered. Around 120 Americans died taking them.

Then the support left. Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, who had lost two carriers in three months and was worried about fuel and air attack, announced on the evening of 8 August that he was withdrawing his three carriers. That night a Japanese cruiser force under Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa came down the channel between the islands and, in about half an hour off Savo Island, sank four Allied heavy cruisers, one of them Australian, and killed more than a thousand sailors for trifling loss. Mikawa did not go on to attack the transports. But with no air cover, they sailed the next afternoon with much of the division’s food, heavy equipment and barbed wire still in their holds.

The Marines ashore went onto two meals a day, part of it captured rice, and finished the airfield with Japanese machinery. They named it Henderson Field after a Marine pilot killed at Midway. The first aircraft flew in on 20 August. That same night a Japanese detachment of about 900 men, sent on the assumption that only a raiding party held the island, charged across a sandbar at the mouth of a creek and was all but wiped out.

How it came to this

In the six months after December 1941 Japan had taken Malaya, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and Burma and pushed a defensive perimeter out into the south-west Pacific. The southern Solomons, a British protectorate of scattered islands with a few planters, missionaries and about 95,000 Melanesian inhabitants, came into it in May 1942, when Japanese forces occupied the small colonial capital at Tulagi. An airfield on Guadalcanal would let bombers threaten the sea route between the United States and Australia.

American strategy officially put Germany first. Admiral Ernest King, the navy’s chief, argued that Japan must not be allowed to dig in, and after the carrier victory at Midway in June he won approval for a limited offensive. It was assembled in weeks, with too few ships and maps drawn from old charts and tourists’ photographs; the men involved called it Operation Shoestring. Warning of Japanese movements depended heavily on the coastwatchers, colonial officers and planters who had stayed behind with radios, and on the islanders who hid and fed them.

How each side saw it

The Japanese army and navy

Imperial headquarters at first took the landing for a reconnaissance in force by perhaps 2,000 men, and fed in troops piecemeal by destroyer at night, a method its own officers called rat transportation. Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka, who ran these convoys, wrote after the war that the campaign was lost by underestimating the enemy and by dividing effort between Guadalcanal and New Guinea. Soldiers’ diaries recovered on the island record men living on roots and grass. Japanese veterans called it Starvation Island. Of some 36,000 sent, about 31,000 died, most from hunger and disease.

Solomon Islanders

The war arrived without their consent and was fought across their gardens and villages. Islanders served as scouts, carriers, guides and rescuers of airmen and sailors; Jacob Vouza, a retired police sergeant, was tied to a tree, bayoneted and left for dead by a Japanese patrol and still got through to warn the Marines. Thousands worked in the labour corps. Their accounts, collected in oral history projects decades later, also describe bombed villages, abandoned plantations, and the shock of seeing Black American troops paid and equipped like white ones. That experience fed the Maasina Rule movement for self-government after 1944.

The Marines and the navy

Marines who were there never forgave Fletcher. Vandegrift’s memoir and the official histories described the carriers’ departure as running away, and the phrase ‘the navy left us’ entered Marine lore. Naval officers answered that the three carriers were most of what the United States had left in the Pacific, and that losing them would have lost the campaign. Over the following months the navy fought a series of night actions in the waters off the island and lost about three times as many dead as the ground forces did.

What is disputed

Fletcher’s withdrawal is the central argument. Samuel Eliot Morison’s semi-official history condemned it; John Lundstrom’s study of 2006, using the fuel and aircraft returns, concluded he acted reasonably on what he knew. Why Mikawa left the transports untouched after Savo, when their loss might have ended the operation, is debated in Japan as well. Casualty totals vary with the source: Richard Frank’s figures of about 7,100 Allied and 30,000 or more Japanese dead on land, sea and in the air are the most often cited. Whether Guadalcanal or Midway deserves to be called the turning point of the Pacific war is a matter of emphasis.

What followed

The fighting lasted six months. Japan made three major attempts to retake the airfield and fought seven large naval battles around the island before evacuating its surviving troops by destroyer in early February 1943. It could not replace the ships, aircraft and trained pilots it lost; the United States could. From Guadalcanal the Allied advance moved up the Solomons towards Rabaul. The waters off the north coast, where dozens of warships lie, are still called Ironbottom Sound. Honiara, the capital of independent Solomon Islands since 1978, grew up beside the wartime airfield, which is now the country’s international airport.

Read further

  • Richard B. Frank, Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle (1990)
  • Samuel Eliot Morison, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942-February 1943 (1949)
  • John B. Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal (2006)
  • Richard Tregaskis, Guadalcanal Diary (1943)
  • Geoffrey M. White and others (eds), The Big Death: Solomon Islanders Remember World War II (1988)

Same day, other years

1420

Work begins on Brunelleschi’s dome

Florence, ItalyEurope

Florence had been building its cathedral for more than a century and had left a hole in the roof 140 feet across, wider than any dome raised since antiquity, with no idea how to close it. The timber for conventional scaffolding and centring would have cost a fortune, if trees large enough could be found. Filippo Brunelleschi, a goldsmith and clockmaker by training, persuaded the cathedral’s overseers that he could build without centring at all. Work started on 7 August 1420, the masons being given a breakfast of bread, melons and wine. He used two shells, one inside the other, bricks laid in a herringbone pattern that locked each course, and hoists of his own design driven by oxen. The dome was closed in 1436.

Seen from elsewhere. Lorenzo Ghiberti was appointed alongside him on equal pay and claimed in his memoirs to have shared the direction for eighteen years. The story that Brunelleschi exposed his rival’s ignorance by feigning illness comes from his admiring biographer Manetti, and the tale of the egg stood on end from Vasari, a century later.

1819

Bolivar wins at the bridge of Boyaca

Boyaca, New Granada (Colombia)The Americas

In the rainy season of 1819 Simon Bolivar led about 2,500 men from the flooded plains of the Orinoco over the Andes by a pass more than 13,000 feet high, losing men and nearly all his horses to cold. The royalist commander, Colonel Jose Maria Barreiro, fell back towards Bogota. On 7 August the patriots, with Francisco de Paula Santander commanding the vanguard and a legion of British and Irish volunteers in the line, caught his army divided at a small bridge over the Teatinos River. The battle lasted about two hours. Barreiro and some 1,600 of his men were captured. The viceroy fled the capital, and Bolivar rode into it three days later. New Granada was effectively free of Spanish rule.

Seen from elsewhere. Most of the soldiers on the royalist side were Americans, not Spaniards, and loyalty to the crown ran deep in regions such as Pasto, whose Indigenous and mestizo people resisted the republic for years. In October Santander had Barreiro and thirty-eight captured officers shot in Bogota, an act Bolivar deplored and royalists long remembered.

1933

The Simele massacre

Simele and Dohuk district, northern IraqMiddle East

Iraq had become independent of the British mandate in 1932. Among those uneasy at the change were the Assyrians, Christians many of whom had fled from the Ottoman Empire during the First World War and whose men had served in British-officered levies. In early August 1933, after a band of armed Assyrians who had crossed into Syria returned and clashed with Iraqi troops at the border, the army under General Bakr Sidqi, joined by irregulars, turned on Assyrian villages across the north. Men were shot in groups; villages were looted and emptied. The worst killing was at the town of Simele on 11 August. Assyrians observe 7 August as Martyrs’ Day. Estimates of the dead range from about 600 to 3,000.

Seen from elsewhere. The Iraqi government described the operation as the suppression of an armed rebellion, and Bakr Sidqi’s troops were cheered through Mosul and Baghdad. British officials recorded the killings but pressed for no inquiry. The lawyer Raphael Lemkin cited the event when he first proposed, that same year, an international crime of the kind he later named genocide.

1998

Bombs at the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam

Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, TanzaniaAfrica

At about half past ten in the morning a lorry packed with explosives blew up behind the United States embassy in the centre of Nairobi. Minutes later a second went off outside the embassy in Dar es Salaam, 400 miles away. In Nairobi the blast brought down a neighbouring office block and shattered a crowded bank tower; 213 people were killed there and eleven in Dar es Salaam, and more than 4,000 were injured. Twelve of the dead were American. The rest were Kenyans and Tanzanians: embassy staff, office workers, bus passengers, people in the street. The attacks were the work of al-Qaeda, and made its leader, Osama bin Laden, widely known for the first time.

Seen from elsewhere. Kenyan survivors have campaigned for decades over compensation, pointing out that Americans and embassy employees were provided for while most African victims received little. Two weeks after the bombings American missiles struck camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum; Sudan has always denied that the plant made chemical weapons, and the evidence was never made public.

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