Shortly after six on the morning of 7 August 1942, cruisers and destroyers opened fire on the north coast of Guadalcanal and on the small islands of Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo twenty miles across the sound. Low cloud and rain had hidden the approach of some eighty ships, and the Japanese on shore had no warning. A radio operator on Tulagi got off a message that a large enemy force had arrived, and later a last one saying the garrison would defend its post to the death.
On Guadalcanal itself the landing was almost unopposed. About 11,000 men of the 1st Marine Division, under Major General Alexander Vandegrift, went ashore east of Lunga Point and pushed inland through coconut plantations and kunai grass. Their objective was an airstrip the Japanese had nearly finished, whose discovery by reconnaissance a month earlier had turned a planned operation into an urgent one. The builders, some 2,500 men, most of them Korean and Japanese labourers, fled west into the jungle. By the afternoon of the second day the Marines held the runway, along with stores of rice, a power plant, trucks and an ice-making machine.
The small islands were different. On Tulagi and the twin islets of Gavutu and Tanambogo about 900 Japanese naval troops fought from caves and dugouts for the better part of three days. Almost none surrendered. Around 120 Americans died taking them.
Then the support left. Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, who had lost two carriers in three months and was worried about fuel and air attack, announced on the evening of 8 August that he was withdrawing his three carriers. That night a Japanese cruiser force under Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa came down the channel between the islands and, in about half an hour off Savo Island, sank four Allied heavy cruisers, one of them Australian, and killed more than a thousand sailors for trifling loss. Mikawa did not go on to attack the transports. But with no air cover, they sailed the next afternoon with much of the division’s food, heavy equipment and barbed wire still in their holds.
The Marines ashore went onto two meals a day, part of it captured rice, and finished the airfield with Japanese machinery. They named it Henderson Field after a Marine pilot killed at Midway. The first aircraft flew in on 20 August. That same night a Japanese detachment of about 900 men, sent on the assumption that only a raiding party held the island, charged across a sandbar at the mouth of a creek and was all but wiped out.
How it came to this
In the six months after December 1941 Japan had taken Malaya, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and Burma and pushed a defensive perimeter out into the south-west Pacific. The southern Solomons, a British protectorate of scattered islands with a few planters, missionaries and about 95,000 Melanesian inhabitants, came into it in May 1942, when Japanese forces occupied the small colonial capital at Tulagi. An airfield on Guadalcanal would let bombers threaten the sea route between the United States and Australia.
American strategy officially put Germany first. Admiral Ernest King, the navy’s chief, argued that Japan must not be allowed to dig in, and after the carrier victory at Midway in June he won approval for a limited offensive. It was assembled in weeks, with too few ships and maps drawn from old charts and tourists’ photographs; the men involved called it Operation Shoestring. Warning of Japanese movements depended heavily on the coastwatchers, colonial officers and planters who had stayed behind with radios, and on the islanders who hid and fed them.