By the middle of August 1717 Prince Eugene of Savoy was in the worst position of his career. He had crossed the Danube in June with one of the largest armies the Habsburgs had ever put in the field, close to 100,000 men, and dug in around Belgrade, the fortress at the meeting of the Danube and the Sava that was the key to the Balkans. The garrison of some 30,000 under Mustafa Pasha was strong and well supplied. Then, at the end of July, the Grand Vizier Haci Halil Pasha arrived with a relieving army that Habsburg reports put at 150,000 or more and that was certainly much larger than Eugene’s. Halil did not attack. He entrenched on the high ground behind the besiegers, brought up his heavy guns and began to bombard them from the rear, while the fortress fired on them from the front.
Eugene’s men were dying in their trenches of dysentery and fever in the marshy ground between the rivers; he could count on perhaps 60,000 fit to fight. To retreat across the bridges under fire from both sides was barely possible. To sit still was to be worn away. On 14 August a mortar bomb landed on a powder magazine inside Belgrade, and the explosion killed, by report, some 3,000 people. Eugene judged it the moment. He left a screen facing the fortress and ordered the rest, about 40,000, to attack the Grand Vizier’s lines before dawn on the 16th.
The night was clear at first. Then a thick fog rose from the rivers. The columns set off in the small hours, and cavalry on the right wing lost direction, blundered into an Ottoman trench and started the battle earlier than planned. For several hours men fought blind at a few paces. The Habsburg wings pushed forward on diverging lines, and a gap opened between them into which Ottoman infantry advanced, close to cutting the attacking army in two.
At about eight o’clock the fog lifted. Eugene, who was fifty-three and had been wounded many times in thirty years of war, saw the gap, put himself at the head of the second line and led it in; he was wounded again. The gap was closed. Bavarian infantry then stormed the great battery on the heights that had done the most damage and turned the guns round. By mid-morning the Ottoman army was withdrawing towards Nis, abandoning its camp, well over a hundred guns and its stores.
Habsburg losses were about 5,000 killed and wounded; Ottoman losses are usually given as 15,000 to 20,000. The garrison, having watched its relief march away, asked for terms two days later and was allowed to leave with its families and the city’s Muslim inhabitants. Eugene entered a city that was largely empty.
How it came to this
The Ottoman Empire had taken Belgrade in 1521 and reached Vienna twice, in 1529 and 1683. The failure of the second siege opened a long Habsburg counter-offensive. Belgrade itself was captured in 1688 and lost again in 1690, and at Zenta in 1697 Eugene, then thirty-three, destroyed a sultan’s army as it crossed the river Tisza. The Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 gave the Habsburgs Hungary and Transylvania.
The new war began elsewhere. In 1715 the Ottomans recovered the Peloponnese from Venice in a single campaign, and the emperor Charles VI, Venice’s ally, intervened the following year. In August 1716 Eugene defeated and killed the Grand Vizier Silahdar Ali Pasha at Petrovaradin, then took Temesvar, the last Ottoman fortress in Hungary. Belgrade was the logical next step. The prince himself was by origin neither Austrian nor German: born in Paris to a branch of the house of Savoy, refused a commission by Louis XIV, he had offered his sword to the emperor at nineteen and risen to be president of the war council and the most admired soldier in Europe.