Parallax

23 August, 1939

Hitler and Stalin make a pact

In one night in the Kremlin, the two regimes that had defined themselves as each other’s mortal enemy agreed not to fight, and in a protocol kept secret for fifty years divided the countries between them. Nine days later Europe was at war.

Moscow, Soviet Union

Joachim von Ribbentrop, Hitler’s foreign minister, landed in Moscow around midday on 23 August 1939 in the Fuhrer’s own Condor aircraft. The airport had been dressed for him with swastika flags which, the story goes, had to be borrowed from a film studio that had been using them for anti-Nazi pictures. He was driven to the former Austrian legation, ate a quick lunch, and by mid-afternoon was in the Kremlin, where to his surprise he found not only the foreign commissar, Vyacheslav Molotov, but Stalin himself.

The public part of the business was simple and had been largely agreed by telegram: a treaty of non-aggression for ten years, each side undertaking not to attack the other or to support a third power that did. The real negotiation concerned a separate document. Stalin wanted the Baltic region defined. Germany had offered a line that left the Latvian ports of Libau and Windau on its side; Stalin asked for them. Ribbentrop broke off to telephone Hitler at his house above Berchtesgaden. Hitler sent for an atlas, looked, and replied within the hour: yes, agreed.

When the talks resumed late in the evening the secret protocol was settled in a few paragraphs. Finland, Estonia and Latvia fell to the Soviet sphere of interest, Lithuania to the German. Poland was to be divided roughly along the rivers Narew, Vistula and San, and whether any Polish state should remain was left for later. Germany declared its lack of interest in Bessarabia, then part of Romania.

Food and drink were brought in. Stalin proposed a toast: he knew how much the German nation loved its Fuhrer, and would therefore like to drink his health. The German record of the evening notes further toasts to the pact, to the new era, and to Ribbentrop. Hitler’s photographer, Heinrich Hoffmann, was allowed to take pictures. The documents were signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop at about two in the morning of 24 August and carry the date of the 23rd. As the Germans left, Stalin told Ribbentrop that the Soviet government took the pact very seriously, and that he could give his word of honour that the Soviet Union would not betray its partner.

A British and French military mission had been in Moscow for twelve days, trying to negotiate an alliance. It was received by Marshal Voroshilov on the 25th and told that further conversation was pointless.

How it came to this

Through the mid-1930s Soviet policy, under the foreign commissar Maxim Litvinov, had been to build collective security with the western democracies against Germany. The Munich agreement of September 1938, at which Britain and France gave Hitler the Czech borderlands without consulting Moscow, persuaded Stalin that the western powers would be content to see Germany turn east. In March 1939 Hitler occupied the rest of the Czech lands, and Britain and France guaranteed Poland. In May Stalin replaced Litvinov, who was Jewish and identified with the western line, with Molotov.

That summer the Soviet Union was courted by both sides. The British and French sent a delegation of middling rank by slow passenger ship; it arrived on 11 August without authority to conclude anything, and the talks stuck on Voroshilov’s question whether Poland and Romania would let the Red Army cross their territory to meet a German attack. Poland would not. Germany, with its invasion of Poland fixed for late August, could offer what the western powers could not: territory. Hitler wrote to Stalin personally on 20 August asking him to receive Ribbentrop at once.

How each side saw it

The Soviet and Russian state

Moscow’s position, then and for decades, was that the western powers had tried at Munich to turn Hitler eastward, had not negotiated seriously in 1939, and had left the Soviet Union no choice but to buy time and space to rearm. The existence of the secret protocol was denied until 1989, when a commission under Alexander Yakovlev reported and the Congress of People’s Deputies condemned it. President Putin called the pact immoral in 2009; in an article of 2020 he defended it as one of many agreements with Hitler made by European states, and laid the greater blame on Munich and on Poland.

Poland and the Baltic states

For Poles the agreement was a fourth partition, carried out when the Red Army crossed the frontier on 17 September 1939, sixteen days after the Germans. There followed the deportation of hundreds of thousands of Polish citizens to Siberia and Kazakhstan and the shooting of some 22,000 officers and officials at Katyn and elsewhere in 1940. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were occupied and annexed in 1940. All four countries regard 23 August as the day their fate was decided over their heads, and reject the argument that Soviet security could justify it.

Berlin

For Hitler the pact removed the danger of a war on two fronts and, through the trade agreement that went with it, blunted any British blockade. The day before it was signed he told his generals at the Berghof that Poland was now where he wanted it. Ribbentrop reported that he had felt in the Kremlin as if among old party comrades. Many long-standing Nazis, raised on anti-Bolshevism, were dismayed; the party ideologue Alfred Rosenberg recorded in his diary his sense that the pact sat badly with twenty years of struggle against Bolshevism.

Communists abroad

Parties that had spent five years building popular fronts against fascism were told by the Communist International, within weeks, that the war was an imperialist quarrel in which the democracies were no better than Germany. The British party’s general secretary, Harry Pollitt, who had welcomed the war against Hitler, was removed from his post. The French party was banned. Thousands of members left, among them writers and intellectuals who dated their break with communism from this night. Others stayed, some arguing that Stalin knew best, and were vindicated in their own eyes in June 1941.

What is disputed

Stalin’s motive is the main argument. Geoffrey Roberts and others see a defensive move forced by western hesitation; historians such as Roger Moorhouse stress that Stalin gained territory and worked with Germany for nearly two years, supplying grain and oil. Whether an alliance with Britain and France was ever achievable, given Polish refusal and mutual distrust, is unresolved. A text purporting to be a speech by Stalin on 19 August 1939, welcoming a long war between the capitalist powers, has circulated since that year; most specialists doubt its authenticity. The Soviet originals of the protocol were produced from the archives only in 1992.

What followed

Germany invaded Poland on 1 September. A second treaty on 28 September moved Lithuania into the Soviet sphere in exchange for more of Poland. The Soviet Union attacked Finland in November and annexed the Baltic states and Bessarabia in 1940. The partnership ended on 22 June 1941 when Germany invaded the Soviet Union, which went on to bear the heaviest losses of the war and to keep most of the territory gained under the pact. On 23 August 1989 up to two million people joined hands in a chain across Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to mark the fiftieth anniversary. The European Parliament has since made the date a day of remembrance for victims of both regimes.

Read further

  • Roger Moorhouse, The Devils’ Alliance: Hitler’s Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941 (2014)
  • Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953 (2006)
  • Stephen Kotkin, Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941 (2017)
  • Raymond J. Sontag and James S. Beddie (eds), Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office (1948)
  • Anthony Read and David Fisher, The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 1939-1941 (1988)

Same day, other years

1305

William Wallace is executed in London

Smithfield, London, EnglandEurope

Wallace, the son of a minor landholder, had led the Scottish rising against Edward I’s occupation in 1297 and won at Stirling Bridge, then been beaten at Falkirk the next year. He spent the following years as a fugitive and envoy. By 1304 nearly all the Scottish nobility had submitted to Edward; Wallace was excluded from the terms. He was taken near Glasgow early in August 1305 by men of Sir John Menteith and brought south. In Westminster Hall he was made to wear a crown of laurel and heard the charges read without being allowed a defence. He was dragged by horses to Smithfield, hanged, cut down alive, disembowelled, beheaded and quartered.

Seen from elsewhere. To the charge of treason Wallace is reported to have answered that he had never sworn allegiance to Edward. English chronicles call him a brigand and accuse his men of atrocities in northern England in 1297. Much of the Wallace of popular memory comes from a poem by Blind Harry written around 170 years later, and from a film of 1995.

1514

Ottoman guns break the Safavids at Chaldiran

Chaldiran, north-western IranMiddle East

Shah Ismail had founded the Safavid state in 1501, imposed Twelver Shiism on Iran, and won a devoted following among the Turkmen tribes of eastern Anatolia, the Qizilbash, many of whom regarded him as more than human. The Ottoman sultan Selim I treated this as a threat inside his own borders and marched east. On the plain of Chaldiran the Ottomans chained their wagons together, with cannon and janissaries armed with handguns behind them. The Qizilbash cavalry charged repeatedly and was shot to pieces. Ismail, wounded, barely escaped; members of his household were captured. Selim occupied the Safavid capital, Tabriz, for a week before his own troops insisted on going home.

Seen from elsewhere. Safavid chroniclers present a gallant defeat by an enemy who would not fight fairly. Ismail, who had never lost before, is said to have withdrawn from affairs afterwards. Ottoman histories report that Selim had 40,000 Anatolian Qizilbash registered and killed before the campaign; historians question the figure, but Turkey’s Alevis remember him as a persecutor.

1927

Sacco and Vanzetti go to the electric chair

Charlestown, Massachusetts, United StatesThe Americas

Nicola Sacco, a shoe worker, and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, a fish pedlar, were Italian immigrants and anarchists. In 1921 a Massachusetts jury convicted them of murdering a paymaster and a guard during a payroll robbery at South Braintree the year before. The evidence was circumstantial, the judge, Webster Thayer, was openly contemptuous of the defendants outside court, and the trial took place amid a national panic about foreign radicals. Six years of appeals failed. A committee appointed by the governor upheld the verdict. Shortly after midnight both men were executed at Charlestown State Prison. There were demonstrations and riots in Paris, London, Buenos Aires, Johannesburg and Tokyo.

Seen from elsewhere. Prosecutors and many in Massachusetts held that two armed men with false alibis had been fairly convicted. Later ballistics tests, themselves disputed, tied Sacco’s pistol to a fatal bullet, and some historians think Sacco guilty and Vanzetti not. In 1977 Governor Michael Dukakis proclaimed that the trial had been unfair, without ruling on guilt.

1958

China begins shelling Quemoy

Kinmen (Quemoy), Taiwan StraitAsia

Kinmen, or Quemoy, is a group of small islands held by the Nationalist government on Taiwan but lying within sight of the mainland port of Xiamen. In the early evening Communist batteries opened fire on it without warning, landing tens of thousands of shells in the first hours and killing three of the garrison’s deputy commanders at dinner. The bombardment and a naval blockade continued for six weeks. The United States sent the Seventh Fleet to escort supply convoys and gave the Nationalist air force new missiles. In October Beijing announced it would shell only on odd-numbered days. That ritual, later with shells carrying leaflets, went on until 1979.

Seen from elsewhere. Mao’s aims are still debated: to test American resolve, to show support for Arab states after the US landing in Lebanon, or to mobilise the country for the Great Leap Forward. He chose not to take the islands, calling them a noose around America’s neck. Documents leaked by Daniel Ellsberg in 2021 show American commanders pressing for nuclear strikes.

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