Joachim von Ribbentrop, Hitler’s foreign minister, landed in Moscow around midday on 23 August 1939 in the Fuhrer’s own Condor aircraft. The airport had been dressed for him with swastika flags which, the story goes, had to be borrowed from a film studio that had been using them for anti-Nazi pictures. He was driven to the former Austrian legation, ate a quick lunch, and by mid-afternoon was in the Kremlin, where to his surprise he found not only the foreign commissar, Vyacheslav Molotov, but Stalin himself.
The public part of the business was simple and had been largely agreed by telegram: a treaty of non-aggression for ten years, each side undertaking not to attack the other or to support a third power that did. The real negotiation concerned a separate document. Stalin wanted the Baltic region defined. Germany had offered a line that left the Latvian ports of Libau and Windau on its side; Stalin asked for them. Ribbentrop broke off to telephone Hitler at his house above Berchtesgaden. Hitler sent for an atlas, looked, and replied within the hour: yes, agreed.
When the talks resumed late in the evening the secret protocol was settled in a few paragraphs. Finland, Estonia and Latvia fell to the Soviet sphere of interest, Lithuania to the German. Poland was to be divided roughly along the rivers Narew, Vistula and San, and whether any Polish state should remain was left for later. Germany declared its lack of interest in Bessarabia, then part of Romania.
Food and drink were brought in. Stalin proposed a toast: he knew how much the German nation loved its Fuhrer, and would therefore like to drink his health. The German record of the evening notes further toasts to the pact, to the new era, and to Ribbentrop. Hitler’s photographer, Heinrich Hoffmann, was allowed to take pictures. The documents were signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop at about two in the morning of 24 August and carry the date of the 23rd. As the Germans left, Stalin told Ribbentrop that the Soviet government took the pact very seriously, and that he could give his word of honour that the Soviet Union would not betray its partner.
A British and French military mission had been in Moscow for twelve days, trying to negotiate an alliance. It was received by Marshal Voroshilov on the 25th and told that further conversation was pointless.
How it came to this
Through the mid-1930s Soviet policy, under the foreign commissar Maxim Litvinov, had been to build collective security with the western democracies against Germany. The Munich agreement of September 1938, at which Britain and France gave Hitler the Czech borderlands without consulting Moscow, persuaded Stalin that the western powers would be content to see Germany turn east. In March 1939 Hitler occupied the rest of the Czech lands, and Britain and France guaranteed Poland. In May Stalin replaced Litvinov, who was Jewish and identified with the western line, with Molotov.
That summer the Soviet Union was courted by both sides. The British and French sent a delegation of middling rank by slow passenger ship; it arrived on 11 August without authority to conclude anything, and the talks stuck on Voroshilov’s question whether Poland and Romania would let the Red Army cross their territory to meet a German attack. Poland would not. Germany, with its invasion of Poland fixed for late August, could offer what the western powers could not: territory. Hitler wrote to Stalin personally on 20 August asking him to receive Ribbentrop at once.