Snow and fog had held the attack up for nine days. On the morning of 21 February 1916 the weather cleared, and at about a quarter past seven some 1,200 German guns, among them the giant siege mortars that had broken the Belgian forts in 1914, opened fire on the French positions north of Verdun, on the right bank of the Meuse. The first heavy shell, fired from a naval gun twenty miles away, fell in the courtyard of the bishop’s palace in the town.
The bombardment went on for about nine hours along a front of a few miles. It was the heaviest the war had yet seen. Woods were reduced to stumps, trenches disappeared, telephone lines were cut within minutes. Late in the afternoon the German infantry of Crown Prince Wilhelm’s Fifth Army came forward in small groups, some carrying flamethrowers, to find out what was left.
In the Bois des Caures two battalions of light infantry, about 1,300 men, were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Emile Driant, a 60-year-old member of parliament and popular novelist who had been warning for months that Verdun’s defences had been neglected. Enough of his men survived in their concrete shelters to hold the wood through that evening and most of the next day. Driant was shot dead on 22 February while ordering the remnant to fall back. Only a few hundred got out.
For four days the front gave way. On 25 February Fort Douaumont, the largest and most modern of the ring of forts, fell without a fight to a handful of Brandenburg infantrymen who climbed in through an unguarded embrasure; the French had stripped it of most of its guns and garrison the year before. Bells were rung across Germany. In Verdun civilians were leaving and officers were preparing to abandon the right bank.
That night General Philippe Petain was given the command. He ordered that there be no further retreat, reorganised the artillery, and turned the single road from Bar-le-Duc into a supply line along which lorries passed day and night at intervals of seconds. The advance slowed and stopped. What had been planned as a short, sharp blow became a battle that did not end until December. The road was later given the name the Sacred Way by the writer Maurice Barres.
How it came to this
By the end of 1915 the Western Front had been fixed for more than a year, and the German chief of staff, Erich von Falkenhayn, had concluded that a breakthrough was impossible. He judged Britain to be Germany’s principal enemy and France its exhausted instrument. An attack at a point the French could not afford to lose, he reasoned, would draw their reserves into a killing ground commanded by German artillery, and might force France to seek terms.
Verdun suited the purpose. The fortress town sat in a salient, exposed on three sides, with poor rail connections on the French side and good ones on the German. It had symbolic weight, as a frontier stronghold since the treaty that divided Charlemagne’s empire there in 843. And the French command under Joffre, having decided after 1914 that forts were death traps, had removed many of its guns for use elsewhere. Warnings from Driant and others were brushed aside until January 1916, when it was too late to do much.