The Maine had been lying at buoy number four in Havana harbour for three weeks. She had been sent from Key West in late January 1898, after riots in the city by Spanish loyalists, on what Washington called a courtesy call and Madrid understood as a warning. Her captain, Charles Sigsbee, kept his crew aboard to avoid incidents, exchanged formal visits with the Spanish authorities and posted extra sentries at night.
At 9.40 on the evening of Tuesday 15 February, a still, overcast night, the forward third of the ship erupted. Witnesses on shore and on nearby vessels described two reports, a sharp one and then a vast roar, and a column of flame and debris. More than five tons of powder in the forward magazines had gone up. The bow was torn apart and the wreck settled quickly into the mud with her mangled superstructure above water.
The enlisted men’s berths were forward, the officers’ aft. Of about 355 men on board, 260 died that night or were never found, and six more died of their injuries; only two of the dead were officers. Boats from the Spanish cruiser Alfonso XII, moored close by, and from the American passenger steamer City of Washington pulled survivors from the water while ammunition was still going off. Havana’s hospitals took in the wounded, and two days later the city gave the first of the dead a state funeral.
Sigsbee’s telegram that night asked that public opinion be suspended until there was a report. It was not. William Randolph Hearst’s New York Journal announced within two days that the warship had been destroyed by an enemy and offered a 50,000 dollar reward; Joseph Pulitzer’s World was scarcely more cautious. A slogan did the rest: ‘Remember the Maine, to hell with Spain!’
A US Navy court of inquiry under Captain William Sampson sat in Havana, sent down divers, and reported in March that the keel plates were bent inward and that a submarine mine had set off the magazines. It did not say who had laid it. A Spanish naval inquiry, refused access to the wreck’s interior, had concluded that the explosion was internal: there had been no column of water, no dead fish, no cable. Spain offered arbitration and, under pressure, an armistice with the Cuban rebels. President McKinley, who did not want war, sent the question to Congress on 11 April. By the 25th the two countries were at war.
How it came to this
Cuba was the largest remnant of Spain’s American empire, and Cubans had been fighting to end Spanish rule on and off since 1868. The last rising began in 1895, planned by the poet Jose Marti, who was killed in its first weeks, and led in the field by Maximo Gomez and Antonio Maceo. The rebels burned cane fields to make the colony worthless. Spain’s commander, Valeriano Weyler, answered in 1896 by herding the rural population into fortified towns to cut the insurgents off from food and recruits. Disease and hunger in these camps killed well over a hundred thousand people.
Reports of the camps, some accurate and some invented, filled American newspapers engaged in a circulation war. There were also American investments in Cuban sugar, a long-standing belief that the island belonged naturally in the orbit of the United States, and a new steel navy looking for employment. A liberal government in Madrid recalled Weyler and granted Cuba home rule from January 1898, which satisfied neither the rebels nor the Spanish loyalists who rioted against it. Six days before the explosion, the Journal printed a stolen private letter in which Spain’s ambassador called McKinley weak.